Wednesday, December 6, 2017

@sarahjeong @DanielEllsberg Guys, it's time for some decision theory

@Snowden: @sarahjeong @DanielEllsberg Guys, it's time for some decision theory
http://twitter.com/Snowden
via @Snowden

RT @jeffstone500: Wow. EU officials are threatening to challenge the Privacy Shield pact--which undergirds some $260 billion in digital trade--if US spying doesn't change within a year. https://t.co/7P0mtbdaW7

@Snowden: RT @jeffstone500: Wow. EU officials are threatening to challenge the Privacy Shield pact--which undergirds some $260 billion in digital trade--if US spying doesn't change within a year. https://t.co/7P0mtbdaW7
http://twitter.com/Snowden
via @Snowden

@lorenzoFB @tqbf Provider-enabled disclosure is *always* a more realistic threat than "NSA's overscheduled hacker unit is running a live op to get my personal mail spool," because the cheapest, laziest access mechanism is the most likely to be used. But neither is the primary risk for most folks.

@Snowden: @lorenzoFB @tqbf Provider-enabled disclosure is *always* a more realistic threat than "NSA's overscheduled hacker unit is running a live op to get my personal mail spool," because the cheapest, laziest access mechanism is the most likely to be used. But neither is the primary risk for most folks.
http://twitter.com/Snowden
via @Snowden

@lorenzoFB Yes. @tqbf's take is magical thinking, presuming if NSA *has the authority* to try and hack something, they already have (and have no concerns on exfil volume, resourcing, etc). He's no dummy (he was right on DNSSEC; I was wrong), but I feel misses the forest for the trees here.

@Snowden: @lorenzoFB Yes. @tqbf's take is magical thinking, presuming if NSA *has the authority* to try and hack something, they already have (and have no concerns on exfil volume, resourcing, etc). He's no dummy (he was right on DNSSEC; I was wrong), but I feel misses the forest for the trees here.
http://twitter.com/Snowden
via @Snowden

@lorenzoFB Respectfully, misses the point. Requiring NSA to have a ROC operator hack an email provider and task the implant to specially exfiltrate your inbox back to the mother ship is enormously less likely than a persona analyst going "hm, my guy uses Gmail. Let me get my Word template."

@Snowden: @lorenzoFB Respectfully, misses the point. Requiring NSA to have a ROC operator hack an email provider and task the implant to specially exfiltrate your inbox back to the mother ship is enormously less likely than a persona analyst going "hm, my guy uses Gmail. Let me get my Word template."
http://twitter.com/Snowden
via @Snowden

@lorenzoFB Both sides here are a bit confused. Google is a PRISM partner: NSA has 100% guaranteed, provider-enabled access to the inbox of any non-USP they want, so if your concern is NSA, hard to think of a worse choice. For USPs, FBI can get the same, but w warrant. TAO irrelevant here.

@Snowden: @lorenzoFB Both sides here are a bit confused. Google is a PRISM partner: NSA has 100% guaranteed, provider-enabled access to the inbox of any non-USP they want, so if your concern is NSA, hard to think of a worse choice. For USPs, FBI can get the same, but w warrant. TAO irrelevant here.
http://twitter.com/Snowden
via @Snowden

RT @ggreenwald: 2 points about what Ellsberg said here: 1) primary attack on him from Nixon administration was that he was a Kremlin agent (sound familiar?); 2) major difference in how they're perceived is Ellsberg leaked under a GOP president, the other two under Obama: https://t.co/GxjfjFMjuE

@Snowden: RT @ggreenwald: 2 points about what Ellsberg said here: 1) primary attack on him from Nixon administration was that he was a Kremlin agent (sound familiar?); 2) major difference in how they're perceived is Ellsberg leaked under a GOP president, the other two under Obama: https://t.co/GxjfjFMjuE
http://twitter.com/Snowden
via @Snowden